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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This court has jurisdiction of this Petition for Review pursuant to Article 8, §3 of the
Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann., §§35A-4-508(8)(a), 78-2a-3(2)(a), 63G-4-403; and Rule
14 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Is there substantial evidence to support the finding that the claimant voluntarily quit
her employment without good cause or that a denial of benefits is not an affront to fairness
under the equity and good conscience provisions of the rules?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case involves a mixed question of law and fact. "Whether 'good cause' [to quit
employment] exists is a mixed question of law and fact." Denby v. Board of Review, 567 P.2d
626, 630 (Utah 1977). This Court's review under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
is governed by Utah Code Ann. §63G-4-403 "which provides for appellate relief in the event
an agency erroneously interprets or applies the law." Adams v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d
639, 641 (Utah 1989).
Resolution of the issues in this case requires the interpretation of two statutory
provisions. The first, Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(l)(a) (2007) provides that a claimant is
ineligible for benefits if he "left work voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the
division, . . . " The Utah Supreme Court held, in Robinson v. Department of Employment
Sec, that the statutory language in question
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explicitly grants the [division] discretion to determine issues involving
voluntariness and good cause. Accordingly, in reviewing these issues, we
defer to the agency and we will not overturn its decisions regarding
voluntariness and good cause unless we determine it has abused its discretion.
Robinson v. Department of Employment Sec. 827 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
The second statutory provision is Utah Code Ann. §35A-4-405(l)(b) (2007) which
provides that
A claimant shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the claimant leaves
work under circumstances of such a nature that it would be contrary to equity
and good conscience to impose a disqualification.
The equity and good conscience standard
requires the Board to consider factors such as 'the reasonableness of the
claimant's actions' and 'continuing attachment to the labor market.' Because
the statute does not further define these terms, and because the terms are broad
and generalized, the statute implicitly grants the Board discretion to interpret
the terms in determining equity and good conscience
We therefore apply
a reasonableness standard to this issue also. Id. at 254. [referring to what is
now §35A-4-405(l)(c)]
See also Mortonlnt'lv. Auditing Div. Of Utah State Tax Comm'n., 814 P.2d 581, 588
(Utah 1991).
Under the reasoning in Robinson and in Morton, this court should grant deference to
the Workforce Appeals Board and not overturn its decision absent a finding of an abuse of
discretion.
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STATUTES AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
The statutes and rules which are determinative in this matter are set forth verbatim in
Addendum A, and include the following:
§35A-4-405(l), Utah Code Annotated (2007)
§63-46b-16(4)(b), Utah Code Annotated (2007), now §63G-4-403 (2008)
§78A-4-103, Utah Code Annotated (2007)
R994-405-101, Utah Administrative Code (2008)
R994-405-102, Utah Administrative Code (2008)
R994-405-103, Utah Administrative Code (2008)
R994-405-201, Utah Administrative Code (2008)
R994-405-208(4), Utah Administrative Code (2008)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
The claimant, Jennica E. Caldwell, filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits

on January 28, 2009, with an effective date of January 25, 2009. An initial decision by a
Department of Workforce Services (Department) adjudicator denied benefits on the grounds
the claimant voluntarily quit her employment without good cause and that benefits could not
be allowed under the equity and good conscience standard in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. §35A-4-405(l). The Department's original decision was issued on March 3,2009. (See
Addendum B) The claimant appealed that decision to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
and an evidentiary hearing was held on April 14, 2009. On April 15, 2009, the ALJ issued
a decision affirming the Department's original decision denying benefits. (See Addendum C)
The claimant appealed the decision of the ALJ to the Workforce Appeals Board (Board). In
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a decision issued June 30,2009, the Board upheld the ALJ's decision denying unemployment
benefits. A request for reconsideration by the Board was denied in a decision dated
August 5, 2009. (See Addendum D)

The claimant's petition for review was filed

September 2, 2009.
B.

Statement of the Facts.
The claimant, Jennica E. Caldwell, started working for the employer, Maceyfs, Inc.,

on about February 20, 2008, as a freight crew member. Her last day worked was January 8,
2009. (Record, 24:16) On January 8, 2009, when the claimant's work shift ended, the
claimant went to talk to her supervisor. The claimant followed her supervisor to his truck
to discuss concerns she had about work. (R, 24:27-28) The claimant believed the supervisor
treated her unfairly. (R, 25:5-6) The claimant asked her supervisor why he was "being such
and [sic] asshole" and asked him "should I press my lips on your ass?" (R, 35:10-11; 22-24)
The claimant's supervisor told the claimant he did not have to deal with this and told the
claimant she should leave the work site and go home. The supervisor further told the
claimant he would report her conduct to "upper management" and they would contact the
claimant if she was to come back to work. (R, 35:27-28) The claimant asked if she came
back anyway what would happen, and the supervisor replied she may be working for free.
(R, 37:30-32)
The claimant's supervisor reported the claimant's behavior to the upper management.
A member of the management team attempted to contact the claimant by telephone to set up
a meeting between the claimant and her supervisor to resolve their differences. (R, 38:44;
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20:16-18) The employer was unable to reach the claimant by phone and left a message for
the claimant to contact the employer. The claimant did not contact the employer alleging she
did not receive the message. When the employer did not hear from the claimant, it decided
she quit. (R, 39:20-22) The claimant testified the employer had a grievance procedure but
she did not file a grievance. (R, 26:3-8) She testified she did not file a grievance because she
was too embarrassed and humiliated to have further contact with the employer. (R, 26:16,
26:25-27, 27:37-39)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
There is substantial evidence in the record to show the claimant voluntarily quit
without good cause, making her ineligible for unemployment benefits. The denial of benefits
to the claimant was not contrary to equity and good conscience. Even if it was determined
the claimant was discharged she would still be ineligible for unemployment benefits. The
claimant failed to meet her burden of marshaling the evidence as required under Heinecke
v. Dept of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 (Utah App. 1991). The ALJ and the Board
adjudicated all relevant issues, and none of the decisions issued was arbitrary or capricious.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ALJ AND THE BOARD FOUND THE EMPLOYER'S
WITNESSES MORE CREDIBLE THAN THE CLAIMANT. THAT
CREDIBILITY DETERMINATION SHOULD BE UPHELD.
The claimant argues on appeal that she did not quit her position but rather she was
discharged. The Board found she quit by not returning the employer's telephone call and by
5

not contacting the employer after she was placed on suspension. The claimant had a verbal
altercation in the parking lot with her supervisor. This occurred after work and the
supervisor told the claimant he did not want to deal with it then and there. The claimant
persisted and used inflammatory language directed at her supervisor. Alarmed by the
claimant's insubordinate and inappropriate language, the supervisor testified he told the
claimant to leave and she would be contacted about returning to work. The employer's
witnesses testified that after the incident, several unsuccessful attempts were made to reach
the claimant by telephone and a message was left on the claimant's voice mail instructing her
to contact the employer to set up a meeting.
The claimant testified her supervisor told her she was fired. She testified the employer
has a formal grievance procedure but she did not avail herself of the process because the
supervisor "hurt [her] feelings" during the discussion on her last day of work. The claimant
also testified that the employer did not call her after the incident. She testified she kept her
telephone with her because she was waiting for a call from the employer. She testified she
did not start looking for a new job for a few days after the incident because she was not sure
"it was real". She testified she did not contact the employer because she was too embarrassed
and humiliated after the final incident with her supervisor.
The ALJ found that employer's witnesses were more credible than the claimant on the
reason for the separation and the circumstances surrounding the separation. The ALJ
specifically found that the claimant used inappropriate language in the discussion with her
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supervisor, that the claimant was told she was suspended not discharged, and that the
employer attempted to contact her by telephone about coming back to work.
Unemployment insurance hearings, like many adversarial hearings, involve two or
more opposing parties who purport to have the only accurate version of events, yet whose
stories differ-sometimes significantly.

For this reason, a judge is tasked with the

responsibility to hear testimony, consider evidence, and then determine which party is most
credible-in other words, determine which version of events is most likely true. Since the
ALJ is in the unique position of being an active participant in the hearing, interacting with
the parties and also questioning the witnesses, the ALJ is the appropriate authority to make
determinations regarding credibility. Those determinations should not be disturbed on appeal
short of clear evidence of abuse. As this court has held: "It is for the administrative agency,
and not this court, to choose between conflicting facts." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department
ofEmp Sec, 657 P.2d 1312 (Utah, 1982).
It is not unusual in unemployment cases for the employer and the claimant to have
completely different versions of what led to the job separation. In many cases, the claimant
believes he or she was fired while the employer believes the claimant quit. The ALJ must
determine which party was the moving party in causing the job separation. Here the ALJ
found that the claimant was the moving party. The Board upheld that determination as there
is ample evidence in the record to support that credibility finding.
The claimant's testimony as to what she said to her supervisor during the January 8
meeting was confusing and contradictory. When asked, during cross examination, if she
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remembered what she said, she first testified she did not remember. When asked if she called
her supervisor an asshole she testified: "No, I absolutely don't recall that." (R, 31:15). When
asked to review the January 8 memo (R, 9) prepared by her supervisor about the incident the
following exchange occurred (R, 31:41-43; 32:1-2):
CLAIMANT I do not recall any of that. I can't even imagine that.
CLARK

So the conversation was - didn't use any of that kind of
language, correct?

CLAIMANT No. But it wouldn't matter anyway because we have talked like
that to each other before.
First the claimant testified she did not recall what she said during the meeting. Then
she denied calling her supervisor an asshole. Finally she testified she and the supervisor
talked like that to each other before.
In contrast, the supervisor's testimony was consistent throughout these proceeding and
identical to the memo he prepared the day after the event. This consistency makes the
supervisor's testimony more convincing regarding what was said by the parties on the
claimant's last day of work.
The claimant's supervisor testified he told the claimant she should go home and it was
his intent to report her conduct upper management He testified he toM her isffte would be
contacted about whether she should come back to work. The claimant, in contrast, testified
she was never told she would be contacted. (R, 3 3:22-26) The claimant's testimony regarding
whether the supervisor told her she would be contacted by the employer is not consistent with
her actions. She testified that after the January 8,2009, incident she kept her telephone with
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her because she expected a telephone call, apparently from the employer. She also testified
she did not start looking for a new job for a few days because she wanted to make sure "it
was real." She did not file a claim for unemployment benefits until January 28,2009, nearly
three full weeks after her last day of work. Finally, she did not file a grievance with the
employer. If the claimant truly believed she was wrongly discharged on January 8,2009, she
would have filed a grievance, immediately filed a claim for unemployment benefits, and
immediately started looking for new work. If she is to be believed and the supervisor did not
tell her she would be called by the employer, why did she testify she kept her telephone with
her at all times because she expected a call from the employer? The claimant knew she had
only been suspended and not discharged.
The claimant alleges on appeal that the documentation submitted by the employer to
the Department, specifically, the official notice of claim filed, shows that she was discharged
for insubordination and the "discharge" box was marked by the employer on that form. The
claimant argues that the discrepancies between that document and the testimony presented
at the hearing "proves that [the employer's] account of the events are [sic] inaccurate and
their paperwork goes against their verbal testimony."
The claimant fails to state that in conjunction with marking the "discharge" box on the
form in question, the employer also wrote the words: "see attached." Attached to that form
is the memo (R, 8 and 9) written by the claimant's supervisor and discussed during the
hearing. That memo supports the employer's version of events. The memo states that at the
conclusion of the January 8,2009, conversation, the supervisor told the claimant to go home.
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He also told her he was going to report her behavior to upper management and upper
management would contact the claimant about coming back to work. The attached memo
modifies and explains the notation on the form to show it was a quit, not a discharge.
The Department is charged with the responsibility of determining the reason for the
separation under its rules. How the parties classify the job separation is largely irrelevant.
The Department, the ALJ, and the unanimous Board found the claimant quit under
Department rules. It is noted the document in question is signed by an individual who did
not participate in the hearing and perhaps did not have all of the information available about
this case. Finally, even if the Board had found that the claimant was discharged instead of
quitting, benefits would be denied.
To deny benefits in a discharge, the employer would have to prove just cause under
Department rule R994-405-201. (See Addendum A)

Insubordination is grounds for

discharge under Department rule R994-405-208(4). Calling your supervisor "an asshole",
asking him if he wanted you to "put your lips on his ass ," and refusing to leave when asked
to is insubordinate behavior. The Department would have found that the employer proved
all three elements of just cause: knowledge, control, and culpability.
A job separation is determined to be a quit when the claimant is the moving party in
determining when the job ends. Arrow Legal Solutions Group, P,C. v. Dep't of Workforce
Servs., 2007 UT App 9. Here, there is no evidence the employer intended to end the
employment relationship and, indeed, the employer attempted to contact the claimant after
the January 8, 2009, incident to discuss the matter. The claimant's failure to return the
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employer's telephone call or otherwise show that she was interested in keeping her job was
the proximate cause of the separation, not any action by the employer.
The claimant quit by not contacting the employer after the January 8 incident. The
employer did not discharge the claimant. The credibility determination is supported by the
overwhelming weight of the evidence.

POINT II
THE CLAIMANT DID NOT ESTABLISH GOOD CAUSE FOR
VOLUNTARILY QUITTING HER EMPLOYMENT, AND A DENIAL
OF BENEFITS IS NOT CONTRARY TO EQUITY AND GOOD
CONSCIENCE.
When a claimant voluntarily quits employment, the claimant bears the burden of
proving she either had good cause for severing the employer relationship, or that it would be
an affront to fairness to deny benefits under the equity and good conscience standard under
the provisions of 35A-4-405(l)(a). (See Addendum A) The claimant failed to meet her
burden of proof.
The good cause provision, Department rule R994-405-102, provides that a claimant
must show that an immediate severance of the employment relationship was necessary to
avoid a hardship the claimant did not have the ability to control or prevent. (See
Addendum A)
The rule requires that a claimant first show that remaining employed would have had
an adverse effect causing an "actual or potential physical, mental, economic, personal or
professional harm . . . [as] measured against the actions of an average individual, not one
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who is unusually sensitive." The claimant testified that she believed she was being treated
unfairly and did not want further contact with the employer, or any of the employees who still
worked for the employer, because she was embarrassed about having been discharged or by
the way she believed she had been treated. There is no evidence that the claimant suffered
actual or potential harm by remaining employed or by calling the employer to learn of her
status. An average person, one who was not unusually sensitive, would have taken steps to
preserve her job. If the claimant believed her supervisor treated her unfairly she had
alternatives to quitting, including discussing her concerns about being treated unfairly with
management personnel or filing a grievance. While the claimant testified she did not receive
any communication from the employer after the argument with her supervisor, a reasonable
person would have overcome her embarrassment and initiated contact to ascertain her
employment status and possibly retain her job.
The good cause rule also requires a showing that the complained of problems were
beyond the claimant's ability to control or prevent. The claimant must show that the situation
was so egregious that it was impossible to continue working while she found another j ob, that
there were no reasonable alternatives to quitting, and that the employer was given notice and
an opportunity "to make changes that would eliminate the need to quit. An employee with
grievances must have made a good faith effort to work out the differences with the employer
before quitting unless those efforts would have been futile."
The claimant had the ability to control or prevent her alleged grievances. The
claimant had alternatives available but instead chose to confront her supervisor in an
insubordinate manner, using profanity to express her dissatisfaction. Even if she believed
12

she had been discharged, she had avenues available to her to control the situation. If, as the
claimant alleges, she was treated and/or discharged unfairly by her supervisor, she could have
filed a grievance. Absent that, she could have contacted upper management to discuss her
concerns. She failed to do either. Her failure to follow up on the matter with the employer
was not reasonable.
This court has consistently held that "unemployment compensation is legislatively
created to ameliorate the hardship of those who, through no fault of their own, find
themselves unemployed." Swiecicki v. Department of Employment Sec, 667 P.2d 28, 30
(Utah 1983) The court has also held "the termination is considered voluntary if it was 'at the
volition of the employee, in contrast to a firing or other termination at the behest of the
employer;" Adams v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 639, 641 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The
claimant is not unemployed through no fault of her own.
As this court stated in Slane v. Department of Workforce Services, et. al, 2000 UT
App 67, f3, "having a 'good reason' to quit and having 'good cause' to quit are not the same
thing." It is not at all clear the claimant even had a good reason to quit, let alone good cause.
The claimant has failed to meet her burden to establish that any of the elements of a
voluntary quit with good cause were met.
According to the Utah Administrative Code, if good cause is not established, the
claimant's eligibility must be considered under the equity and good conscience standard
under Department rule R994-405-103. (See Addendum A)
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The equity and good conscience standard has three components. A claimant must first
show that "there were mitigating circumstances, and a denial of benefits would be
unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness . . . " Here the claimant wanted to discuss her
problems with her supervisor. She followed him to his truck as he was leaving work and
made inappropriate and insubordinate comments to her supervisor. When the supervisor told
the claimant he did not want to discuss the matter then and there, the claimant, instead of
leaving and trying to talk to her supervisor at a better time, continued her inappropriate
conduct. At that point she was told to leave and was told the employer would be in contact
with her. The employer tried to contact her and left a message. The claimant did not attempt
to contact the employer claiming she was embarrassed and humiliated. These are not the type
of mitigating circumstances contemplated by the rule.
Next, the rule requires that the claimant show that the decision to quit was reasonable.
Reasonable is defined as: "logical, sensible, or practical. There must be evidence of
circumstances which . . . would have motivated a reasonable person to take similar action."
The claimant's actions in quitting were not logical, sensible, or practical. When she left the
employer's premises following the discussion with her supervisor, she had reason to expect
management would be contacting her shortly to further discuss her concerns. A reasonable
person would have taken steps to contact the employer to confirm her employment status
when no such contact had been made within a short period of time.
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Finally, the claimant must prove a continuing attachment to the labor market. The
claimant testified she was performing a job search during the hearing. She is presumably
attached to the labor market.
This court has held that the
equity and good conscience provision is not an occasion for a free-wheeling
judicial foray into the record and imposition of a decision consistent with this
panel's collective sense of equity and fairness. On the contrary, that
determination is one for the Department and ultimately the Board of Review,
see Utah Code Ann. §35-4-5(a) (1987), [now §35A-4-405(l)(b)] with this
court's role limited, as explained above, to deciding whether the findings
support a decision that "equity and good conscience" do not require
compensation and whether "evidence of any substance" supports the findings.
We are obliged to give considerable deference to the Board's determination of
whether equity requires compensation. Moreover, the concept is not as wideopen as it might seem, but rather has been defined and refined by statute, id.;
by rule, Utah Administrative Code R475-5a-3 (1988); and by case law, e.g.,
Chapman v. Industrial Comm'n, 700 P.2d 1099, 1101-02 (Utah 1985); Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Department of Employment Sec., 657 P.2d 1312, 1317
(Utah 1982).
Chapman v. Industrial Comm'n, 700 P.2d 1099 (1985) is the only case this author can
find where Utah's appellate courts reversed a Board decision and allowed benefits under the
equity and good conscience provision. In that case, the claimant was a 62-year-old woman
who proved that her supervisor was erratic, swore at the claimant, accused the claimant of
doing things she had not done, and "subjected the claimant to unreasonable fits of anger."
The Board denied benefits finding the claimant had an obligation to notify someone in upper
management about the problem with the supervisor. The claimant in Chapman testified that
she did not report the supervisor to upper management because the supervisor was in ill
health and the claimant did not want to be the cause of the supervisor losing her job. The

15

Utah Supreme Court found that, given the claimant's age, the intolerable supervisor, and the
claimant's explanation for not reporting the supervisor, a denial of benefits would be an
affront to fairness.
This case is very different. In Chapman the ALJ found that the supervisor's treatment
of the claimant was unacceptable. There is no such finding here. Here the supervisor told
the claimant he did not want to discuss the problem in the parking lot at the end of the day.
Additionally, the claimant in this case engaged in inappropriate and insubordinate conduct
by asking her supervisor if he expected her to "press her lips to his ass" and telling the
supervisor he was "an asshole." There was no finding that the claimant in Chapman behaved
inappropriately. Finally, the claimant presented no reason for not reporting her supervisor
to upper management if she believed she had been treated unfairly. A denial of benefits is
not an affront to fairness.

POINT III
THE CLAIMANT ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT
WAS NOT PRESENTED DURING THE HEARING IN THIS MATTER.
The claimant provided her phone records for the first time when she filed her appeal
to the Board. The claimant argues that these records show that the employer did not attempt
to call her in the days after January 8, 2009. The Board refused to consider these phone
records because they were not provided during the hearing. When the claimant filed her first
appeal, dated March 15, 2009, she knew that the employer was alleging it attempted to
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contact her after January 8, 2009. The claimant thus knew, prior to the hearing, that her
phone records could be relevant.
Prior to the hearing the parties were sent an appeal brochure explaining the hearing
procedure. The brochure also advises parties on how to prepare for a hearing and says, in

Preparation for the Hearing
The hearing before the ALJ is your only chance to present everything relevant
to the case. A record of the hearing will be made, and the ALJ may consider
only the evidence introduced during this hearing. Further review and decisions
on appeal are limited solely to the evidence introduced at this hearing. Take
time to prepare for your hearing. Know the issue or issues involved. Obtain
documents that help prove your facts and provide them to the ALJ and
opposing party. Also, be sure to line up witnesses which support your side of
the case, [emphasis in original]
The parties were also sent an instruction sheet entitled "Hearing Notice Instructions."
That sheet states, in part:

PREPARING FOR THE HEARING:
In order for the Judge to make the best decision, the judge must hear all of the
relevant information about the issues listed on the Notice of Hearing. Be
prepared to present all the information you want the Judge to consider. . . .
DOCUMENTS:

Enclosed are documents that may be made part of the
hearing record.. . .

If you have additional documents to be considered by the Judge, you
MUST mail, fax, or hand-deliver the documents to the Judge and all
other parties before the hearing....
Documents not provided in a timely manner may not be considered
by the Judge.
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IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTION PERTAINING TO THE HEARING,
CALL THE APPEALS UNIT AT 801-526-9300 or 877-800-0671.
[emphasis in original]
The ALJ also told the parties, at the beginning of the hearing, to be sure and present
all the evidence the party wanted to be considered during the hearing. Department rules
provide:
R994-508-305.

Decisions of the Board.

(2)
Absent a showing of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the
Board will not consider new evidence on appeal if the evidence was
reasonably available and accessible at the time of the hearing before the ALJ.
When the claimant presented the phone records for the first time with her appeal to
the Board, the Board sent her a letter asking her to explain why she did not provide the
records at the time of the hearing. The claimant did not respond to that letter. The phone
records were available to the claimant at the time of the hearing, the claimant was on notice
that it would be an issue at the hearing, and the claimant failed to provide any evidence of
extenuating circumstances which would allow the documents to be admitted after the
hearing.
The employer was not given an opportunity to review the alleged phone records or to
present rebuttal evidence to those records. The Board properly refused to consider that
evidence and so should this court. It would be a denial of the employer's due process rights
to accept this new evidence at this point.
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POINT IV
THE CLAIMANT HAS NOT MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE IN
SUPPORT OF THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE WORKFORCE
APPEALS BOARD.
The finding that the claimant did not have good cause for quitting was based on
competent evidence in the record, primarily, the testimony of the claimant and the employer.
In order to successfully challenge this finding, the claimant "must demonstrate that the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court.'1 The court should reject the claimant's appeal for her failure to marshal the
evidence in support of her conclusion that the findings were without foundation. The Board
recognizes that the claimant is proceeding pro se and might not be held to the strict
procedural standards expected of claimants who are represented by counsel. However, the
burden when challenging a factual finding is an extremely heavy one and the claimant has
presented no evidence or arguments sufficient to overcome this burden.
In Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818 (Utah App. 1992), the court refused to entertain
the appellant's factual challenges since the appellant failed to meet its marshaling burden:
[The Appellant] has neither marshaled the evidence in support of the finding
nor demonstrated that the finding is clearly erroneous, but instead cites only
evidence that supports the outcome she desires. See Crooks ton v. Fire Ins.
Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991) (citing only evidence favorable to one's
position "does not begin to meet the marshaling burden...."). We therefore
assume that the record supports the finding of the trial court Id. at 820.
[Emphasis added]
This court expanded upon the appellant's burden to marshal the evidence in
Oneida/SLICv. Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872P.2d 1051 (UtahApp. 1994):
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Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual findings lightly. We
repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when
challenging factual findings. Id. at 1052.
The court reasoned that to successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact,
"appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. '[Parties] must extricate [themselves] from
the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position.'" Id. at 1053, citing West Valley
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The court further
explained that proper marshaling requires the challenger to:
. . . present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant
resists. West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App.
1991); accord In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assocs. v.
Clayton, 863 P.2d29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 849
P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). Oneida at 1053.
Then, after an appellant has established:
. . . every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they then "must ferret out
a fatal flaw in the evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support the trial
court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. They must show the trial
court's findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of
the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Bartell, 116 P.2d at 886
(quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). Oneida at 1053.
The claimant here has made no attempt to meet her marshaling burden. She has
pointed to no evidence in the record to show that the findings of the Board are so "against
the clear weight of the evidence" that they are "clearly erroneous." The record below is
supported by the evidence and entitled to a presumption of validity. See also Grace Drilling
Company v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), where this court
held that
20

. . . the 'whole record test1 necessarily requires that a party challenging the
Board's findings of fact must marshal all of the evidence supporting the
findings and show that despite the . . . contradictory evidence, the findings are
not supported by substantial evidence.

CONCLUSION
The claimant has raised no competent argument in support of her appeal. This court
should, therefore, affirm the decision of the Board disqualifying the claimant from the receipt
of unemployment benefits, pursuant to §3 5 A-4-405( 1) of the Utah Employment Security Act.
Respectfully submitted this 5

day of April, 2010.

^ +
^UZANPIXTON
Attorney for Respondent
Workforce Appeals Board
Department of Workforce Services
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35A-4-405. Ineligibility for benefits.
Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (5), an individual is ineligible for benefits
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(l)(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without good cause,
if so found by the division, and for each week thereafter until the claimant has performed
services in bona fide, covered employment and earned wages for those services equal to at
least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount.
(b)
A claimant may not be denied eligibility for benefits if the claimant leaves
work under circumstances where it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to
impose a disqualification.
(c)
Using available information from employers and the claimant, the division
shall consider for the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions,
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor
market in reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to
equity and good conscience.
(d)
Notwithstanding any other subsection of this section, a claimant who has left
work voluntarily to accompany, follow, or join the claimant's spouse to or in a new locality
does so without good cause for purposes of Subsection (1).

63G-4-403. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with
the appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate
appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional
filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the
record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any
of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or
has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decisionmaking body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;

R994-405-102.

Good Cause.

To establish good cause, a claimant must show that continuing the employment would
have caused an adverse effect which the claimant could not control or prevent. The claimant
must show that an immediate severance of the employment relationship was necessary. Good
cause is also established if a claimant left work which is shown to have been illegal or to
have been unsuitable new work.
(1)

Adverse Effect on the Claimant.

(a)

Hardship.

The separation must have been motivated by circumstances that made the continuance
of the employment a hardship or matter of concern, sufficiently adverse to a reasonable
person so as to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. There must have been actual
or potential physical, mental, economic, personal or professional harm caused or aggravated
by the employment. The claimant's decision to quit must be measured against the actions of
an average individual, not one who is unusually sensitive.
(b)

Ability to Control or Prevent.

Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on the claimant, good cause will
not be found if the claimant:
(i)
reasonably could have continued working while looking for other employment,
(ii)
had reasonable alternatives that would have made it possible to preserve the
job like using approved leave, transferring, or making adjustments to personal circumstances,
or,
(iii) did not give the employer notice of the circumstances causing the hardship
thereby depriving the employer of an opportunity to make changes that would eliminate the
need to quit. An employee with grievances must have made a good faith effort to work out
the differences with the employer before quitting unless those efforts would have been futile.
(2)

Illegal.

Good cause is established if the claimant was required by the employer to violate state
or federal law or if the claimant's legal rights were violated, provided the employer was
aware of the violation and refused to comply with the law.

(3)

Unsuitable New Work.

Good cause may also be established if a claimant left new work which, after a short
trial period, was unsuitable consistent with the requirements of the suitable work test in rule
R994-405-306. The fact the claimant accepted a job does not necessarily make the job
suitable. The longer a job is held, the more it tends to negate the argument that the job was
unsuitable. After a reasonable period of time a contention the quit was motivated by
unsuitability of the job is generally no longer persuasive. The Department has an affirmative
duty to determine whether the employment was suitable, even if the claimant does not raise
suitability as an issue.
R994-405-103.

Equity and Good Conscience.

(1)
If the good cause standard has not been met, the equity and good conscience
standard must be considered in all cases except those involving a quit to accompany, follow,
or join a spouse as provided in R994-405-104. If there are mitigating circumstances, and a
denial of benefits would be unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness, benefits may be
allowed under the provisions of the equity and good conscience standard if the claimant:
(a)

acted reasonably.

The claimant acted reasonably if the decision to quit was logical, sensible, or practical.
There must be evidence of circumstances which, although not sufficiently compelling to
establish good cause, would have motivated a reasonable person to take similar action, and,
(b)

demonstrated a continuing attachment to the labor market.

A continuing attachment to the labor market is established if the claimant took
positive actions which could have resulted in employment during the first week subsequent
to the separation and each week thereafter. An active work search, as provided in R994-403113c, should have commenced immediately after the separation whether or not the claimant
received specific work search instructions from the Department. Failure to show an
immediate attachment to the labor market may not be disqualifying if it was not practical for
the claimant to seek work. Some circumstances that may interfere with an immediate work
search include illness, hospitalization, incarceration, or other circumstances beyond the
control of the claimant provided a work search commenced as soon as practical.

R994-405-201.

Discharge - General Definition.

A separation is a discharge if the employer was the moving party in determining the date the
employment ended. Benefits will be denied if the claimant was discharged for just cause or for an
act or omission in connection with employment, not constituting a crime, which was deliberate,
willful, or wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest. However, not every legitimate
cause for discharge justifies a denial of benefits. A just cause discharge must include some fault on
the part of the claimant. A reduction of force is considered a discharge without just cause.

ADDENDUM A

R994-405-208.

Examples of Reasons for Discharge.

In the following examples, the basic elements of just cause must be considered in determining
eligibility for benefits.

(4)

Insubordination.

An employer generally has the right to expect lines of authority will be followed; reasonable
instructions, given in a civil manner, will be obeyed; supervisors will be respected and their
authority will not be undermined. In determining when insubordination becomes disqualifying
conduct, a disregard of the employer's rightful and legitimate interests is of major importance.
Protesting or expressing general dissatisfaction without an overt act is not a disregard of the
employer's interests. However, provocative remarks to a superior or vulgar or profane language in
response to a civil request may constitute insubordination if it disrupts routine, undermines authority
or impairs efficiency. Mere incompatibility or emphatic insistence or discussion by a claimant,
acting in good faith, is not disqualifying conduct.
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S.S.A. NO:

CASE NO:

XXX-XX-3625

09-A-G4147

APPEAL DECISION: Benefits are denied.
The Employer is relieved of charges.

CASE HISTORY:
Appearances:
Issues to be Decided:

Claimant /Employer
35A-4-405(l)
35A-4-405(2)(a)
35A-4-307
-

Voluntary Quit
Discharge
Employer Charges

The original Department decision denied unemployment insurance benefits on the grounds the Claimant was
discharged for disqualifying reasons. That decision also relieved the Employer's benefit ratio account for
benefits paid to the Claimant.
APPEAL RIGHTS: The following decision will become final unless, within 30 days from April 15,2009?
further written appeal is received by the Workforce Appeals Board (PO Box 45244, Salt Lake City, UT
84145-0244; FAX 801-526-9244; or online at http://www.jobs.utah.gov/appeals) setting forth the grounds
upon which the appeal is made,
FINDINGS OF FACT:
Prior to filing a claim for unemployment insurance benefits against the state of Utah effective January 25,
2009, the Claimant last worked as a freight crew member for Maceys Inc. from February 20, 2008, lo
January 8, 2009.
On January 8,2009, when the Claimant's work shift ended, the Claimant went to talk to her supervisor. The
Claimant followed her supervisor to his truck to discuss her concerns. The Claimant was concerned that she
did "three times as much work" as anyone else, and that she did not care for the way her supervisor gave her
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orders. The Claimant asked her supervisor why he was "being such and asshole" and also remarked "should
I press my lips on your ass". The Claimant's supervisor told theClaimant he did not have to deal with this
and told the Claimant she should leave the work site and go home. The supervisor further told the Claimant
he would speak with upper management and they would contact the Claimant if she was to come back to
work. The Claimant asked if she came back anyway what would happen, and the Claimant's supervisor
replied she may be working for free.
The Claimant's supervisor reported the Claimant's behavior to the Employer. The Employer attempted to
phone the Claimant to set up a meeting between the Claimant and her supervisor to resolve their differences.
The Claimant did not receive the Employer's phone call The Employer did not hear again from the
Claimant
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Section 35A-4-405(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act provides that an individual is ineligible for
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting period if the Claimant left work voluntarily without good
cause or if a denial of benefits would not be contrary to equity and good conscience. The Unemployment
Insurance Rules pertaining to this section provide, in part:
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 35A-4-405(l) of the Utah Employment Security
Act provide, in pertinent part:
R994-405-102.

Good Cause.

To establish good cause, a claimant must show that continuing the employment would
have caused an adverse effect which the claimant could not control or prevent. The claimant
must show that an immediate severance of the employment relationship was necessary.
Good cause is also established if a claimant left work which is shown to have been illegal
or to have been unsuitable new work.
(1)

Adverse Effect on the Claimant.

(a)

Hardship.

The separation must have been motivated by circumstances that made the continuance
of the employment a hardship or matter of concern, sufficiently adverse lo a reasonable
person so as to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. There must have been actual
or potential physical, mental, economic, personal or professional harm caused or aggravated
by the employment. The claimant's decision to quit must be measured against the actions of
an average individual, not one who is unusually sensitive.
(b)

Ability to Control or Prevent.

Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on the claimant, good cause will not
be found if the claimant:

ADDENDUM C
Jennica E. Caldwell
(i)

- 3-

09-A-04147

reasonably could have continued working while looking for other employment,

(ii)
had reasonable alternatives that would have made it possible to preserve the job
like using approved leave, transferring, or making adjustments to personal circumstances,
or,
(iii)
did not give the employer notice of the circumstances causing the hardship
thereby depriving the employer of an opportunity to make changes that would eliminate the
need to quit. An employee with grievances must have made a good faith effort to work out
the differences with the employer before quitting unless those efforts would have been futile.
(2)

Illegal.

Good cause is established if the claimant was required by the employer to violate state
or federal law or if the claimant's legal rights were violated, provided the employer was
aware of the violation and refused to comply with the law.
(3)

Unsuitable New Work.

Good cause may also be established if a claimant left new work which, after a short trial
period, was unsuitable consistent with the requirements of the suitable work test in rule
R994-405-306. The fact the claimant accepted a job does not necessarily make the job
suitable. The longer a job is held, the more it tends to negate the argument that the job was
unsuitable. After a reasonable period of time a contention the quit was motivated by
unsuitability of the job is generally no longer persuasive. The Department has an affirmative
duty to determine whether the employment was suitable, even if the claimant does not raise
suitability as an issue.
R994-405-103.

Equity and Good Conscience,

(1)
If the good cause standard has not been met, the equity and good conscience
standard must be considered in all cases except those involving a quit to accompany, follow,
or join a spouse as provided in R994-405-104. If there are mitigating circumstances, and a
denial of benefits would be unreasonably harsh or an affront to fairness, benefits may be
allowed under the provisions of the equity and good conscience standard if the claimant:
(a)

acted reasonably.

The claimant acted reasonably if the decision to quit was logical, sensible, or practical.
There must be evidence of circumstances which, although not sufficiently compelling to
establish good cause, would have motivated a reasonable person to take similar action, and,
(b)

demonstrated a continuing attachment to the labor market.

A continuing attachment to the labor market is established if the claimant took positive
actions which could have resulted in employment during the first week subsequent to the
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separation and each week thereafter. An active work search, as provided in R994-403-113c,
should have commenced immediately after the separation whether or not the claimant
received specific work search instructions from the Department. Failure to show an
immediate attachment to the labormarket may not be disqualifying if it was not practical for
the claimant to seek work. Some circumstances that may interfere with an immediate work
search include illness, hospitalization, incarceration, or other circumstances beyond the
control of the claimant provided a work search commenced as soon as practical.
The Claimant was the moving party in the job separation therefore, the Claimant voluntarily quit
employment. The Claimant was sent home from work but she was told she would hearfrommanagement
regarding her position. The Employer testified, during the hearing, that the Claimant was left a voice mail
message to contact the Employer to try and resolve the problems with her supervisor. The Claimant
testified, during the hearing, that she did not get the message from the Employer and assumed she was
discharged. Although the Claimant may have believed she was discharged, the Claimant should have made
an effort to contact management to resolve her concerns. The Claimant testified, during the hearing, that
she thought "she would get a call". When the Claimant did not receive a phone call the Claimant should
have contacted the Employer to determine her employment status. Because the Claimant made no effort to
retain her employment, the Claimant was the moving party in the separation and, and such, voluntarily quit
employment.
In a voluntary quit case the burden of proof rests with the Claimant to establish good cause for quitting. For
good cause to be established the Claimant must show that continued employment would have an adverse
affect on the Claimant, or that the job was illegal, or that the job duties constituted new unsuitable work no
harm would have been caused by remaining employed. The Claimant's job was not illegal nor were the
Claimant's job duties new unsuitable work. Good cause has not been established.
In this case the Claimant did not act reasonably. The Claimant acted unreasonably when she failed to
contact the Employer after she did not hear from the Employer. Because the Claimant acted unreasonably,
the equity in good conscience standard does not apply.
An Employer may be relieved of charges when the Claimant was separated from employment for reasons
which would have resulted in a denial of benefits under Section 35A-4-405(l) or Section 35A-4-405(2) of
the Utah Employment Security Act, In this case the reason for the Claimant's separation is disqualifying,
therefore, the Employer is relieved of charges.
DECISION AND ORDER:
The Department's decision denying unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to Section 35A-4-405(l) of
the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed. Benefits are denied effective January 25, 2009, and
continuing until the Claimant has returned to bonafidecovered employment, earned six times her weekly
benefit amount and is otherwise eligible.
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The Employer is relieved of liability for charges in connection with this claim, as provided by Section 35 A4-307 of the Utah Employment Security Act.

Valeroe Argyle
Administrative Law Judge
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE SERVICES

Issued: April 15,2009
VA/rs
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:
Case No. 09-B-00540

MACEYS INC.,
EMPLOYER

:

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed.
Benefits are denied.
The Employer is eligible for relief of benefit charges.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a decision dated April 15, 2009, Case No. 09-A-04147, the Administrative Law Judge affirmed
a Department decision and denied unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant effective
January 25, 2009. The Employer, Maceys Inc., was found eligible for relief of benefit charges in
connection with this claim.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto.
CLAIMANT APPEAL FILED: May 13, 2009.
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT:
1.

Did the Claimant have good cause to quit her employment pursuant to the provisions of
§35A-4-405(l)?

2.

Is it contrary to equity and good conscience to deny unemployment insurance benefits
pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-405(l)?

3.

Is the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-307(l)?

ADDENDUM D

09-B-00540

-2-

XXX-XX-3625
JENNICA E. CALDWELL

FACTUAL FINDINGS:
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge.
REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Claimant worked for this Employer as a member of the freight crew for just over ten months.
She quit when she failed to return to work after a discussion with her supervisor. The Department
and the Administrative Law Judge denied benefits and the Claimant filed this appeal.
The Claimant wanted to talk to her supervisor after her shift ended on January 8,2009. She saw him
in the parking lot and approached him. The Claimant and the supervisor both testified during the
hearing providing completely different versions of what occurred during that conversation.
The Claimant testified that she just wanted to talk to him about how she felt he treated her unfairly
and she wanted to talk things out. She testified she had talked to him after work in the parking lot
before. She testified he started getting angry and said he did not want to talk about it right then. She
testified she told him she could "not work like this" and the problem needed to be solved. He then
said, according to the Claimant "you're done". The Claimant asked what he meant by that and he
said, "you're fired."
The supervisor denied telling the Claimant she was "done" or fired. He testified she asked him why
he was "being such an asshole" and that she asked him if she "should press her lips to his ass." The
supervisor testified that he told the Claimant he did not have to deal with this type of conversation
and the Claimant should go home. He testified he also told the Claimant he was going to talk to
upper management about the way she was talking to him and they would contact her about when she
should come back to work. He testified the Claimant then asked what would happen if she came to
work before she was called and he told her she might be working for free.
The Employer's witnesses testified the Employer attempted to contact the Claimant about coming
in for a meeting. The witness testified he was not able to talk directly with the Claimant because she
did not answer he telephone but at least one message was left on her phone. The Employer
concluded she had quit by not showing up for work or returning the Employer's calls.
The Claimant testified the Employer never called her after the incident in the parking lot. She
believed she had been discharged. The Claimant testified she received no messages and no attempts
were made to call her.
Whenever two parties give divergent testimony, a credibility determination must be made. It is the
duty of the administrative law judge to consider conflicting testimony and determine which party is
more credible. Since the Administrative Law Judge is in the unique position of being an active
participant in the hearing, interacting with the parties and also questioning the witnesses, the Judge's
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credibihty finding will usually not be disturbed by the Board. If there is evidence in the record to
support the credibihty finding made by the Administrative Law Judge, the Board will not substitute
its own judgment for that of the Judge unless there is a clear showing of error. Here the
administrative law judge found that the Employer's witnesses were more credible than the Claimant.
There is ample evidence in the record to support that finding. There is no showing of error.
The Claimant presents her phone records to the Board on appeal. She did not present those records
during the hearing in this matter. Prior to the hearing the parties were sent an appeal brochure
explaining the hearing procedure. The brochure also advises parties on how to prepare for a hearing
and says, in part:
Preparation for the Hearing
The hearing before the ALJ is your only chance to present everything relevant to the
case. A record of the hearing will be made, and the ALJ may consider only the
evidence introduced during this hearing. Further review and decisions on appeal are
limited solely to the evidence introduced at this hearing. Take time to prepare for
your hearing. Know the issue or issues involved. Obtain documents that help prove
your facts and provide them to the ALJ and opposing party. Also, be sure to line up
witnesses which support your side of the case, [emphasis in original]
The parties were also sent an instruction sheet entitled "Hearing Notice Instructions". That sheet
states, in part:

PREPARING FOR THE HEARING:
In order for the Judge to make the best decision, the judge must hear all of the
relevant information about the issues listed on the Notice of Hearing. Be prepared
to present all the information you want the Judge to consider. . . .
WITNESSES:

If you wish to have someone testify, you must arrange for that
person to be available at the time of the hearing. The best
witness has firsthand knowledge of what he or she is
testifying about....

DOCUMENTS:

Enclosed are documents that may be made part of the hearing
record....
If you have additional documents to be considered by the
Judge, you MUST mail, fax, or hand-deliver the documents
to the Judge and all other parties before the hearing. . . .

ADDENDUM D

09-B-00540

-4-

XXX-XX-3625
JENNICA E. CALDWELL

Documents not provided in a timely manner may not be
considered by the Judge.
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTION PERTAINING TO THE HEARING, CALL
THE APPEALS UNIT AT 801-526-9300 or 877-800-0671. [emphasis in original]
The administrative law judge also told the parties, at the beginning of the hearing to be sure and
present all the evidence the party wants to be considered during the hearing.
Department rules provide:
R994-508-305.

Decisions of the Board.

(2)
Absent a showing of unusual or extraordinary circumstances, the
Board will not consider new evidence on appeal if the evidence was reasonably
available and accessible at the time of the hearing before the ALL
The reason for this rule is that an appeal to the Board is an appeal on the record. That means that
the Board reviews the evidence before the administrative law judge and not new evidence. Providing
evidence after the hearing deprives the other party of the opportunity to cross examine witnesses and
provide rebuttal evidence, if available. The right of cross examination and the right to rebut evidence
are important due process rights that must be protected.
Courts and administrative bodies are charged with the responsibility of resolving disputes between
individuals. Parties to a lawsuit or administrative procedure have the right to know that the dispute
will reach finality at some point in time. To ensure that the rights of all parties are protected, courts
and administrative bodies set trials and hearings so that the parties might fully present any and all
evidence and arguments in support of their position. After the hearing or trial no new evidence can
be accepted except under unusual circumstances as explained in the rule mentioned above. Although
the Board understands that to an inexperienced party the rules seem overly technical, those rules are
necessary. Many if not most losing parties would want a new hearing to try and present a "better11
case. If the Board granted those requests it would unnecessarily delay and burden the hearing
process.
Department rules provide:

R994-403-116e.

Eligibility Determinations: Obligation to Provide Information.
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(1)
The Department cannot make proper determinations regarding
eligibility unless the claimant and the employer provide correct information in a
timely manner. Claimants and employers therefore have a continuing obligation to
provide any and all information and verification which may affect eligibility.
(2)
Providing incomplete or incorrect information will be treated the same
as a failure to provide information if the incorrect or insufficient information results
in an improper decision with regard to the claimant's eligibility.
R994-508-109.

Hearing Procedures.

(9) . . . A party has the responsibility to present all relevant evidence in its
possession. When a party is in possession of evidence but fails to introduce the
evidence, an inference may be drawn that the evidence does not support the party's
position.
In addition to the phone records, the Claimant argues additional facts on appeal that were not in
evidence in the hearing. The evidence presented by the Claimant on appeal was available at the time
of the hearing. The Claimant has not explained any extenuating circumstances which would warrant
accepting this new evidence now. The new evidence presented by the Claimant on appeal was not
considered in reaching this decision.
The Claimant takes exception in her letter of appeal to the Board with many statements in the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge. The Claimant infers things in the Administrative Law
Judge which were not said. For instance, the Claimant argues on appeal that nothing had happened
during the day at work which led her to approach her supervisor in the parking lot. If nothing had
happened that day, it is not clear why the Claimant, according to her own testimony, told her
supervisor they needed to talk about her problems right then. It would have been far more
appropriate and professional for the Claimant to talk to her supervisor during work hours instead of
approaching him in the parking lot after the shift ended.
The Administrative Law Judge found that the Claimant acted unreasonably when she approached
her supervisor and used language that was confrontational and unprofessional. This warranted
telling the Claimant to leave and await further contact from the Employer. The Employer tried
several times to reach the Claimant without success. The Claimant argues on appeal that she did not
attempt to contact the Employer because she was humiliated because she thought she had been fired.
Even if the Claimant believed she had been fired, she had a responsibility to contact the Employer
to ascertain her job status. If she had done nothing wrong, the Claimant would not have felt
humiliated by the alleged discharge. The Claimant did not establish good cause to quit.
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A denial of benefits in this case is not an affiront to fairness. There are no extenuating circumstances
which would allow for an award ofbenefits in this case. The Claimant's actions were not reasonable.
The reasoning and conclusions of law of the Administrative Law Judge are adopted in full.
DECISION:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge denying benefits to the Claimant effective January 25,
2009, pursuant to the provisions of §35A-4-405(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act, is
affirmed.
The Employer, Maceys Inc., is eligible for relief of benefit charges in connection with this claim as
provided by §35A-4-307(l) of the Act.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to
each party by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered
to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order. If a
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision. This
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for
such an appeal.
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment
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Security Act; §63-46b-16 oftheUtah Adrninistrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 ofthe Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules
9 and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD

Date Issued: June 30, 2009
TV/TL/WS/va/sp/ks
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on
this
30th
day of June, 2009, by mailing the same, postage
prepaid, United States mail to:

MACEYS INC
% EMPLOYER ADVOCATES LLC
PO BOX 25236
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84125-0236
JENNICA E CALDWELL
415E500S
LOGAN UT 84321-5519
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WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

JENNICA E. CALDWELL, CLAIMANT
S.S.A. No. XXX-XX-3625
CaseNo.09-R-00752
RECONSIDERATION
MACEYS INC.,
EMPLOYER

:

DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a letter received July 230,2009, the Claimant, Jennica E. Caldwell, requested reconsideration of
the decision of the Workforce Appeals Board issued in this case on June 30,2009. The decision of
the Workforce Appeals Board was based on a review of a decision of an Administrative Law Judge
after a formal hearing.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Board has jurisdiction to review the request for reconsideration pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated §63-46b-13(3) on the grounds that the Board's decision was final agency action within
the meaning and intent of that section of law.
DECISION:
The Claimant's request for reconsideration is denied. The decision of the Workforce Appeals Board
dated June 30, 2009, remains in effect.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment
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Security Act; §63-46b-16 ofthe Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9
and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD

Date Issued: August 5, 2009
TV/WS/TL/va/sp/ks
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on
this
5th
day of August, 2009, by mailing the same, postage
prepaid, United States mail to:
JENNICA E CALDWELL
415 E 500 S
LOGAN UT 84321-5519
MACEYS INC
% EMPLOYER ADVOCATES LLC
PO BOX 25236
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84125-0236
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CLAIMANT

Well, it's almost correct. I actually did start three days earlier than that, but it's
about right.

JUDGE

Okay.

CLAIMANT

That's w h y -

JUDGE

So February -

CLAIMANT

It's more like the 20 -

JUDGE

- 22nd? What day did you start?

CLAIMANT

Okay. It was the 20th.

JUDGE

Okay. And then you last day worked was 1/8/09?

CLAIMANT

It was.

JUDGE

What was your job title?

CLAIMANT

I was part of the freight crew.

JUDGE

Okay. And what happened then on your last day that caused your employment to
end?

CLAIMANT

I - after my shift had ended, I thought I was being treated unfairly, and I went to
talk to my boss outside, which I had done before. And was trying to talk how I
felt out, because I felt I was being treated unfairly, and I think they should be able
to talk things out. And like the conversation, he just started getting mad, and then
out of the blue he fired me.

JUDGE

What did he say?

CLAIMANT

He just - he said, I don't want to talk about this right now. And I said, well, it
needs to be solved. I said, I can't work like this. And he said - he paused for a
second and he said, you're done. And I said, what do you mean you're done?
And he said, you're out of here. You're fired.
I said - 1 said, you're firing me? I said, you can't do that. And he said, I don't
have to deal with this. And he turned around and got in his truck and left. He
just left me standing there.

JUDGE

Okay. And what-
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CLAIMANT

Just like -

JUDGE

- was it that - why did you believe you were being treated unfairly?

CLAIMANT

During my shift - I get paid the same as everyone else, and I would do three
times as much work. And he was really rude about - 1 mean, everybody he treats
there with respect. He would tell them to go do something really nicely, but to
me, he points out me, do that, do this, do that, and he just being really rude to me.
He was treating me like his slave.

JUDGE

By tell you - by giving you orders?

CLAIMANT

No, no, no, it was the way in which he presented it to me. He was very rude.

JUDGE

Okay. And so did you speak with anyone else, like go up the chain?

CLAIMANT

No, I didn't. I - 1 - no, he's my boss. I've never had to - it wasn't really that big
of a deal. I mean, that's the shocking thing. It really-it wasn't a big deal. And I
don't even know how he got so mad at me.

JUDGE

Okay. And specifically he said you're fired?

CLAIMANT

Yes, he did. He probably - you know, I - he probably said it about two or three
times actually, I mean.

JUDGE

Okay. A n d -

CLAIMANT

Go back to work and I wasn't getting paid. I mean, I - he actually did say the
words you're fired, though.

JUDGE

And so did you make any effort then to retain your employment and talk to -

CLAIMANT

I actually - 1 actually did for probably the next few minutes after I - he could tell
that my face was pretty distraught. And I just sat there, and I kept asking him, I
said, why are you firing? I said, this isn't - this isn't a big deal. What's wrong?
And he just - he wouldn't answer me. He just kept saying, I don't have to deal
with you.

JUDGE

Have you had any prior warnings or discipline?

CLAIMANT

I was a very good worker. I have never had any written discipline.

JUDGE

Okay.

0

JUDGE

Uh-huh.

SWARTZ

And so - and then she was down at the end of the aisle and she looked at me and
said, see, and laughed and then walked off. And I said, okay, why don't we - let's
start basing. Basing is when we take the product on the shelves and pull forward
to the front and make everything look good for the day.

JUDGE

Okay.

SWARTZ

And then after work I sent everyone home. She met me out at my truck and came
up to me and asked me why I was being such an "asshole". I said, how was I
being and asshole? And she says, well, if you don't know, then I guess it's no
point in talking to you.
And I was like, well, frankly I'm tired of putting up with your attitude, Jennica,
and I would like you to go home and I'll talk to upper management about this
issue and then we'll - they'll contact you and let you know when you can come
back to work. A n d -

JUDGE

Yeah.

SWARTZ

- then she got - she got very angry and she said I was acting like a "dick" and that
- the question came up, she said, what would like me to do, press my lips on your
ass? And I said, no, Jennica. I just want you to talk to me like a descent human
being. And then I said, okay, well, this discussion is over with.
I'm going to talk to the upper management about the issue, and they will contact
you and let you know when you can come back to work. And then after that,
that's when I got in my truck and left.

JUDGE

Uh-huh. And so then did you report the Claimant's - what had happened?

SWARTZ

Yes. I reported to my manager that morning.

JUDGE

Uh-huh. And what happened?

SWARTZ

And they -

JUDGE

And would that be then Mr. Butterworth?

SWARTZ

Yes. And that - my managers - Ron and Randy that were there - they were the
only managers that were there that morning.

JUDGE

Uh-huh.
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JUDGE

He's going to testify next, so why don't you ask him?

CLAIMANT

Well, why - John, why did you fire me if you can't?

SWARTZ

I didn't fire you. I just told you that you needed to go home and that upper
management would you contact you.

CLAIMANT

You didn't say that if I came back I'd be working for free?

SWARTZ

That's after you said - the fact that you said you were going to come in anyway-

CLAIMANT

(Inaudible) so you fired me?

JUDGE

Ms. Caldwell?

CLAIMANT

Yes.

JUDGE

Do not interrupt him. You need to allow him to finish his answer.

CLAIMANT

Sorry. I apologize.

JUDGE

Okay. Go ahead. Can you say that again, Mr. Swartz?

SWARTZ

Yes. I - after - when she said that before.

JUDGE

When she said what?

SWARTZ

That she said that she was going to come back in anyway. And I told her that from that point I said, well, you can come in, but you'll be working for free
because upper management needs to speak to you about this issue.

CLAIMANT

That's not true. I was fired. There's no message on my phone. I -

JUDGE

Ma'am, you're going to have your opportunity to make a final statement, and you
kind of need to hold those for that.

CLAIMANT

Okay.

JUDGE

This is the point of the hearing for you to question Mr. Swartz, and so I can't have
you making comments yet. You need to hold off until your final statement, and
then you can make - you may want to jot them down so you remember. But I
can't have you making comments when it's time to question.
18
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CLAIMANT

Okay.

JUDGE

Okay. Do you have any other questions for Mr. Swartz?

CLAIMANT

Just how come he didn't - how come you didn't tell Mr. Butterworth about it?

SWARTZ

Because he was not there the morning of. I told Ron and Randy about the issue.

CLAIMANT

All right.

JUDGE

Thank you, Mr. Swartz. Mr. Butterworth, can you hear me?

BUTTERWORTH

Yes.

JUDGE

Okay. So tell me, is it - who are Ron and Randy?

BUTTERWORTH

Ron and Randy are part of our grocery department, Your Honor. They would be
the supervisors that Brad would see most often -

JUDGE

Okay.

BUTTERWORTH

- as they come in early in the morning.

JUDGE

They would be - who's Brad?

BUTTERWORTH

I'm sorry, they would be John's closest supervisor -

JUDGE

Okay.

BUTTERWORTH

- excuse me.

JUDGE

Well, so they spoke with you, correct?

BUTTERWORTH

No. Actually how I found out it, Your Honor, is when I came in that morningthe following morning, I read John's statement that he had, and that's how I
became aware of the situation.

JUDGE

So then what did you do?

BUTTERWORTH

At that point I tried to make contact with Jennica, and was unable to.

JUDGE

Well, what does that mean? How did you try and -

BUTTERWORTH

I tried to call her on her phone.
19
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JUDGE

What number did you call?

BUTTERWORTH

I believe I used the number that's on our list, which is the number that's listed in
the documents.

JUDGE

Which is?

BUTTERWORTH

Hang on just a second.

JUDGE

Okay.

BUTTERWORTH

I think it's 760-6453.

JUDGE

Okay. And so was there no answer, an answering machine, ring and ring, what?

BUTTERWORTH

There was never no answer. And probably the four or five times that I called
over a period of probably a week to ten days, I do recall leaving at least one
message.

JUDGE

Okay. And anything - did you ever see or speak to the Claimant?

BUTTERWORTH

No.

JUDGE

Okay. Would the Claimant know that Mr. Swartz didn't have the authority to fire
her?

BUTTERWORTH

It would not be something that would be typically talked with, with each
individual team member.

JUDGE

Yeah. So by virtue of (inaudible) her supervisor, the Claimant then could
reasonably think he had that authority?

BUTTERWORTH

Ifm sorry?

JUDGE

Could the Claimant reasonably think that Mr. Swartz had the authority to
discharge her?

BUTTERWORTH

I guess that's possible.

JUDGE

Okay. All right. Anything else you want me to know, Mr. Butterworth?

BUTTERWORTH

Just that as the store leader, I make every attempt in these situations, Your Honor,
to contact the parties. My attempt was to try and get John and her together to
discuss the situation. Using - as I read the documentation, this would not be an
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CLAIMANT

I got along with him and everybody else.

JUDGE

Okay. Does the Employer have like a grievance process?

CLAIMANT

I'm not sure. I had my handbook. I went to retain it yesterday, but they would
not give it to me. They said they were under no obligation. But I - I'm sure that
they do. I know that they do have procedure, and it wasn't followed. But I,
myself, don't have that.

JUDGE

And so if they had a process like that, why didn't you avail yourself of it? Like

CLAIMANT

Well-

JUDGE

- take it -

CLAIMANT

- he fired me. And he fired in such a cruel way.
embarrassed.

JUDGE

Okay. Why - who - what was cruel and humiliating?

CLAIMANT

The way he talked to me.

JUDGE

Okay.

CLAIMANT

He sent me away like a dog. He said go. And then when I tried to talk it out and
ask him explain why was you so mad; why are you mistreating me like this, he
wouldn't give - he turned his back on me and he just left.

JUDGE

Okay. So what-

CLAIMANT

He-

JUDGE

What?

CLAIMANT

He hurt my feelings.

JUDGE

Okay. So what efforts have you made to find work?

CLAIMANT

I've been out applying for jobs every chance that I can get, every day. I look
through the paper. I go - I've been into almost every business in town.

JUDGE

Okay. So what - how many jobs have you applied for?

CLAIMANT

I probably - realistically, I probably applied for at least 40; I'm just thinking. I

I was humiliated and
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haven't kept a list of every single one of them. And I don't always have Internet
access, but I also go online and sign up for -

1

I
)
3
1
2
3
4
.5
;6
17
>8
>9
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

JUDGE

Have you had any - has anything happened with these applications; any
interviews or calls?

CLAIMANT

Not a thing.

JUDGE

Okay. Anything-

CLAIMANT

I've got a couple of dates down that they said to come back, but those aren't until
May. So I'm just going to - I just keep calling these jobs and - but nobody's
leaving their jobs now -

JUDGE

Uh-huh.

CLAIMANT

- and I'm hoping that maybe with school coming out come June. I just kept
calling and checking -

JUDGE

Okay.

CLAIMANT

- nothing.

JUDGE

All right. Anything else you want me to know, Ms. Caldwell, about the job
separation?

CLAIMANT

Well, I just - you - well, there's a couple of things. They put in here that I
actually was discharged, so I didn't voluntarily quit. He told me to leave and not
come back. And they said the reason that they discharged me was
insubordination, which the definition of that is disobedience.
And I did everything that my job - he might - you know, we might have had
problems during that shift, but I've done everything I've ever been told, and I
done it very good and I done it prompt. I - like I said, I've never been written up.
Everyone there knows me. I'm a good worker.
And this is embarrassing. I have not been able to go back into Macey's for
shopping. I've ran into several of the employees, and I can't talk to them because
I can't tell them why I was fired -

JUDGE

Okay.

CLAIMANT

- because I don't know.

o
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JUDGE

Exhibit -

CLARK

9. But in that statement, which obviously is difficult to read; it's a very bad copy,
it says something to the effect I - after work Jennica met me at my truck and
asked me why I was being such an "asshole" earlier.

JUDGE

Is that true?

CLARK

Is that what you said?

CLAIMANT

Excuse me?

CLARK

Is that what you said to him; you asked him why he was being such an "asshole"?

CLAIMANT

No. I absolutely don't recall that.

CLARK

And at some point in here it also says what do you want me to do, press my lips
on your "ass"? Did you say that?

CLAIMANT

No.

CLARK

So he's making this up, right?

CLAIMANT

I absolutely - yeah. I mean, there's other things that have been -

CLARK

And also he says here, and this is about the fourth line from the bottom -

CLAIMANT

Yeah.

CLARK

- it says, well, I'm going to come in anyway and work until Blain talks to me. Did
you say that?

CLAIMANT

I didn't - no, I didn't. I didn't say that. When was this written, the date?

CLARK

Apparently on January 8th it looks like, if you look at the top.

CLAIMANT

Well, t h a t - I don't-

CLARK

Any-

CLAIMANT

-1 do not recall any of that. I can't even imagine that.

CLARK

So the conversation was - didn't use any of that kind of language, correct?
12
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CLAIMANT

No. But it wouldn't matter anyway because we have talked like that to each other
before.

CLARK

When you -

CLAIMANT

It says -

CLARK

Like what - you talked like what before; using that -

CLAIMANT

We have -

CLARK

- kind of language?

CLAIMANT

What?

CLARK

You say you talked like that before; what does that mean?

CLAMANT

We've used - you know, we've joked with each other before using language. I
didn't talk to him like that.

CLARK

When you -

CLAIMANT

If I did, it wouldn't matter because he - like I said, he talks to me like that all the
time. And in a discharge case, if you look under 202, it says that knowledge - the
employee must have had knowledge of the conduct, which the Employer
expected.

JUDGE

Well, stop. Ma'am, I'm well aware of the rules. But I have a question; you said it
wouldn't matter because you talked like that before. Specifically do you - can
you recall things that were said that -

CLAIMANT

I absolutely do not. I don't remember -

JUDGE

Thank you.

CLAIMANT

- any cuss words or any names like that. I - and - and we weren't even in a
heated discussion actually. It was just a discussion until he started getting mad.
And then I didn't get mad until he fired me for no reason, so.

CLARK

When you - when you gave your testimony earlier, you said you were told you're
fired, and your reply was, you can't do that.

CLAIMANT

Idid-
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CLARK

Did you say that?

CLAIMANT

I did say that. I did - because he fired me for no reason. And then when I asked
him-

CLARK

Now is that what - let me ask a follow-up question. If you said you can't do that,
is that because you didn't believe that he had the authority to discharge you?

CLAIMANT

What?

CLARK

Did you believe that Mr. Swartz had the authority to discharge you?

CLAIMANT

Absolutely. I know he did. He's my boss.

CLARK

And yet you said you were going to continue working until you talked to Blain?

CLAIMANT

Well, I absolutely did not say that. That doesn't even make sense, and it doesn't
make sense for someone to be fired and told to come back to discuss it either.

JUDGE

So you were told to come back and discuss it?

CLAMANT

No, but he writes that in there that -

JUDGE

Okay. I see.

CLAIMANT

- that he said that to me, and that's not true either.

CLARK

Thank you, Your Honor. I don't have further questions of the Claimant at this
point.

JUDGE

Okay. We'll move on. Mr. Swartz?

SWARTZ

Yes.

JUDGE

Were those dates of employment correct, February 20th, '08, to January 8th, '09?

SWARTZ

I believe so, yes.

JUDGE

Okay. And what was the Claimant's job title?

SWARTZ

She was part of the freight crew.

JUDGE

Okay. And what caused the Claimant's employment to end? Tell me what
happened.
14
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